Beijing recently held the national “Two Sessions” (the CPPCC and NPC meetings), and observers noted an unusually sharp drop in the number of attending military and defense-industry committee members and delegates. At least 14 military NPC delegates alone have already been publicly removed from their posts. In fact, in recent years the CCP authorities have stopped disclosing how many senior officials are handled. Many, after being removed from office, simply vanish with no word of their whereabouts; even more are placed under investigation with no official notice at all. It is understood that these officials fall under so-called “internal handling,” and some have even been secretly executed.
From “Internal Handling” to Secret Execution
Japanese scholar Suzuki Eiji was arrested in Beijing in 2016 on espionage charges, sentenced to six years in prison, and released to return home in 2022. He said the grounds for his prosecution were utterly absurd—it all began simply because, while chatting with a Chinese friend (diplomat Tang Benyuan), he happened to mention the case of Jang Song-thaek, the uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who had been executed.
According to an interview with Suzuki, Tang Benyuan, a counselor at the former Chinese embassy in Japan who had been in contact with him, was also arrested. While Suzuki was detained, he heard rumors circulating in prison that the CCP's ambassador to Ireland had been secretly sentenced to death for espionage in a first-instance trial.
After Suzuki returned to Japan, he could find no information whatsoever about Tang Benyuan online. He said that in China, the trials and outcomes of espionage cases are never made public. Tang Benyuan, too, was likely sentenced to death.
Zhou Guogang, a former bureau-level official who arrived in the United States some years ago, has said that he once attended a Party study session given by an official from the CCP's Central Military Commission, who mentioned that every year many officials are sentenced to death, but this is never made public.
In the closely watched case of former CCP Foreign Minister Qin Gang, the authorities announced in July 2024 that Qin had “resigned” his positions as a Central Committee member and NPC delegate; his Party membership was not revoked, but no explanation was given as to his whereabouts. There have been reports that Qin was demoted to a low-level position at a publishing house under the Foreign Ministry, though pro-Beijing Hong Kong media denied this.
Qin Gang was removed from his post a month after he first “disappeared,” and rumors ran wild—including claims that he had had an extramarital affair and an illegitimate child, with the woman said to be former Phoenix TV reporter Fu Xiaotian. Other rumors held that Qin was involved in an espionage case or had leaked state secrets, and some even claimed that “Qin Gang is already dead.”
Gao Zhikai, once an interpreter for the late CCP leader Deng Xiaoping, addressed the topic of Qin Gang's disappearance in an interview program on Al Jazeera last August.
Gao said Qin Gang had been a close friend of his for more than 20 years. When the host asked, “Where has Qin Gang gone?” Gao replied: “He is being dealt with swiftly.” “Maybe he's ill, he's somewhere in China—you will never see him again.”
“You will never see him again” also fueled speculation that Qin Gang is already dead. If Qin was indeed involved in leaking secrets, he may have been secretly executed. If not, perhaps he is living out his days in some isolated “camp for corrupt officials,” cut off from the outside world?
The Discipline Inspection Commission That Makes Party-State Officials Tremble
In China, the Discipline Inspection Commission wields boundless power, and officials at every level fear it—when even a lowly staffer from a provincial discipline inspection commission travels somewhere, the local municipal or county Party secretary will personally come out to receive him. From the center to the localities, the discipline inspection apparatus serves as the top leader's cudgel for disciplining others; sometimes, even if a top leader is not aligned with the discipline inspection secretary's own faction, that secretary can compile damaging material on him and report it upward to bring him down.
The CCP has a long tradition of purging its own ranks. Throughout its history, the Party has repeatedly carried out “Party purification” campaigns and “rectification” movements, hunted down “traitors,” slaughtered the so-called “AB Corps,” and used violence and terror to consolidate the dictatorship of its top leader.
The practice of handling officials internally and secretly executing them is nothing new for the CCP—but since Xi Jinping took power, this shadowy set of practices appears to have intensified further.
Li Xi, the current secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, chaired a meeting on February 25 on “standardizing, rule-of-law-izing, and regularizing discipline inspection and supervision work.” What is called “rule of law” here is, in reality, nothing but a smokescreen. “Rule of law,” in practice, simply means a black box.
The Face of the Party-State and Its ‘Leader’
In cases involving espionage or attempted flight abroad, the CCP has always gone to great lengths to cover things up, because such cases touch on the face of the Party-state itself.
Take, for example, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), the massive central state-owned enterprise responsible for nuclear weapons and military industry, which has had major leak scandals in its history. Kang Rixin, former general manager of CNNC, was removed from office in October 2010 on suspicion of serious economic crimes, including gray-market dealings in bidding for nuclear industry projects and embezzling public funds for stock speculation that resulted in massive losses. He was expelled from the Party and later sentenced to life imprisonment. He had previously served as a member of the CCP Central Committee and of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.
Major General Jin Yinan, a professor at China's National Defense University, later revealed in a lecture that Kang Rixin had sold intelligence on the CCP's nuclear materials to foreign parties. “When Kang Rixin's case broke, the central leadership was extremely alarmed and demanded a thorough investigation, but in the end, all they could say publicly was that it was an economic crime, because anything else was simply too sensitive to disclose.”
One important reason why, in the Xi Jinping era, the CCP handles cases involving senior military officers and defense-industry executives through covert “disappearances” is to conceal the truth about the hollow strength of the CCP's military—strong on the outside, weak within. Another reason is that such covert handling also conceals the corruption of CCP officialdom and preserves the top leader's own face.
According to CCP state media propaganda, every single member of the Central Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in both the 19th and 20th Party Congresses was personally vetted and approved by Xi Jinping himself. And the far larger pool of cadres managed directly by the Central Committee (so-called “centrally managed cadres,” generally at the deputy provincial/ministerial level and above, including some at the full bureau level) are appointed only after review by the Organization Department and discussion and approval at meetings of the CCP Politburo.
Take Liu Shiquan, former chairman of China North Industries Group Corporation (Norinco), as an example. He became chairman of Norinco in May 2022, having been vetted by Chen Xi, then head of the Organization Department and one of Xi Jinping's most trusted lieutenants. Chen Xi's review concluded that Liu Shiquan “firmly upholds General Secretary Xi Jinping's core position,” “possesses lofty communist ideals,” and is honest and upright. This review report was submitted to the CCP Politburo for discussion, and won the approval of the majority of Politburo members, Xi Jinping included, leading to Liu's promotion.
But in 2023, Liu Shiquan was removed from his position as a CPPCC member and stripped of his post as chairman of Norinco, with no official explanation given, and outsiders still have no clear idea what has become of him since.
The Number of Senior Officials Secretly Handled Comes to Light
Many people already know that the CCP's official economic statistics cannot be trusted; in fact, its anti-corruption statistics cannot be trusted either, and simply do not add up. But by comparing several sets of anti-corruption figures released since Xi Jinping came to power, one can roughly estimate the number of senior officials who have been secretly handled.
According to 2024 anti-corruption data released earlier this year by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission through the CCP discipline inspection commission's plenary report, 92 centrally managed cadres were investigated in 2024. However, upon going page by page through the “Investigations” section of the discipline inspection commission's official website, this author found that only 58 centrally managed cadres were formally placed under investigation and prosecution in 2024. The other 34 may well have been “handled internally.”
On January 8, 2024, Li Xi, secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, reported at the commission's plenary session that in 2023, the commission and the National Supervisory Commission had placed 87 centrally managed cadres under formal investigation. But upon checking the “Investigations” section of the commission's official website, this author found only 45 centrally managed cadres formally placed under investigation and prosecution in 2023. Another 42 may likewise have been “handled internally.”
Going back further, Xiao Pei, deputy secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, said at a press conference during the CCP's 20th National Congress on October 17, 2022, that since the 18th Party Congress, 553 centrally managed cadres had been placed under formal investigation, including 49 full and alternate members of the 18th Central Committee, 12 members of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 12 full and alternate members of the 19th Central Committee, and 6 members of the 19th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.
Central Committee members, alternate Central Committee members, and Central Commission for Discipline Inspection members are collectively referred to as the “Three Commissions.” According to the official figures above, the number of 18th-term “Three Commissions” members investigated was 49 plus 12, equaling 61; the number of 19th-term “Three Commissions” members investigated was 12 plus 6, equaling 18.
However, at the first press conference of the CCP's 19th National Congress, on October 19, 2017, Yang Xiaodu, deputy secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and Minister of Supervision, announced the anti-corruption figures for the period since the 18th Party Congress: a total of 440 Party and government cadres at the provincial/military level and above, plus other centrally managed cadres, had been formally investigated, including 43 full and alternate Central Committee members and 9 members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.
In other words, according to the five-year figures released at the 19th Congress, the number of 18th-term “Three Commissions” members investigated was 43 plus 9, equaling 52—yet the figure announced at the 20th Congress for fallen 18th-term “Three Commissions” members was 61, nine more than before.
As for members of the “Three Commissions” who fell from grace after the 19th Congress, the authorities have only ever formally announced investigations into four Central Committee members—Fu Zhenghua, Shen Deyong, Liu Shiyu, and Xiao Yaqing—along with two alternate Central Committee members, Zhang Jinghua and Li Jia, and one Central Commission for Discipline Inspection member, Zhang Wufeng—seven people in total. Yet the figure announced at the 20th Congress was 18, a full eleven more than the number officially confirmed.
Conclusion: among the fallen “Three Commissions” members of the 18th and 19th terms combined, there is a discrepancy of nine plus eleven, or twenty people, for which the authorities have offered no explanation whatsoever.
This leaves room for speculation. Zheng Xiaosong, a 19th Central Committee member and then director of the Liaison Office in Macau, reportedly died from a fall attributed to “depression”; Ren Xuefeng, a 19th alternate Central Committee member and then deputy Party secretary of Chongqing, reportedly “died of illness” though rumors suggest he jumped to his death; Liao Guoxun, a 19th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection member and then mayor of Tianjin, reportedly “died of illness” as well. All of them may in fact have already been under internal investigation as senior central officials, merely “made to commit suicide” or “made to die of illness.” As for Zhang Yang, an 18th Central Committee member and then director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, whose death by hanging was officially and publicly announced, this appears to have been a special exception, made public deliberately at the time to intimidate the officialdom amid a power struggle.
Liu Yazhou, a retired general and “princeling” who “disappeared” in 2021, was reportedly secretly sentenced at the end of 2023—another case of “internal handling.” The authorities likely did this in consideration of his political influence, out of concern that a public case might send shockwaves through the Party and the military.
A number of senior officials who have “disappeared” amid the CCP's internal purges over the past two years should also be considered cases of “internal handling.” For example, Yuan Jie, former chairman of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, and Chen Guoying, former general manager of China South Industries Group, both disappeared for extended periods before being quietly removed from office last year, their whereabouts unknown.
In July 2024, Liu Cangli, then director of the China Academy of Engineering Physics—the institute responsible for developing nuclear weapons—and deputy director Mo Zeyao were both removed from their posts, with their whereabouts unknown.
Yu Jianfeng, current chairman of China National Nuclear Corporation, has been absent from multiple meetings this year. Xu Dazhe, a member of the NPC Standing Committee with a background in the defense industry, Lei Fanpei, executive deputy director of the Office of the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development, and Zhang Hongwen, Party secretary of Hefei, have all been repeatedly absent from important meetings as well.
Caixin reported on October 25 last year that Chen Zhaoxiong, former chairman of China Electronics Technology Group, and Wu Manqing, former general manager (now vice president of the Chinese Academy of Engineering), had both been taken away; the report was later deleted, suggesting the two men may also have been “handled internally.”
Lieutenant General Shang Hongzhong, deputy commander of the CCP's Strategic Support Force, had his newly won status as a delegate to the 20th Party Congress revoked shortly before the congress, and has been “disappeared” ever since. As for the corruption case involving the Rocket Force and equipment procurement that erupted in July 2023, the number of officers “handled internally” is likely far greater still.
In December 2023, an analyst at the Canadian think tank Cercius Group, which focuses on research into Chinese elite politics, stated: “So far, in our investigation into the CCP's Rocket Force, we have tracked roughly seventy people who have been taken away.” Yet the officially disclosed list falls far short of that number. Later reports even suggested that the case involving Miao Hua alone implicated hundreds of generals and officers.
Xi Jinping Has Launched a Mode of CCP “Self-Destruction”
Given the large number of officials who have disappeared, and quite possibly been secretly executed, as described above, Xi Jinping's repeated emphasis in recent years on “self-revolution” is, in reality, a mode of “self-destruction.”
On one occasion, addressing senior cadres, Xi Jinping first boasted that the CCP is a great party, saying, “As I see it, the only ones capable of defeating us are ourselves—there is no second possibility.” He then quoted a line from Chapter 74 of Dream of the Red Chamber, spoken by Jia Tanchun during the search of the Grand View Garden: a great clan such as this cannot be destroyed quickly by an attack from outside—as the ancients said, “a centipede dies but does not stiffen”—it must first destroy itself from within before it can suffer total collapse.
“It must first destroy itself from within”—this is indeed a ruthless statement, one that will not rest until the Party itself is gone.
Of course, the CCP has never limited itself to purging within the Party alone—every one of its political campaigns throughout history has also targeted the Chinese people at large.
Since 2018, the National Supervisory Commission, which operates jointly with the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, has begun making extensive use of a detention method called “liuzhi” (retention in custody)—a form of secret detention entirely outside the bounds of the law, lawless in every sense, applied even more often to people outside the Party, including businesspeople, lawyers, rights defenders, and dissidents.
Official CCP figures show that 38,000 people nationwide were subjected to “liuzhi” detention in 2024, a 46.15% surge from 26,000 in 2023. Of these, how many were then “handled internally” and ultimately secretly executed?
The CCP's cancer of corruption is beyond cure, and its “fake anti-corruption” operations are growing ever darker—proof that this regime is walking a single road straight into the dark. But things reach their limit and then reverse; a situation like this cannot possibly continue much longer.