Imagining a "Post-CCP Era"

The Washington think tank Hudson Institute's report, "China After Communism: Preparing for a Post-CCP Era," points out that enormous internal challenges — slowing economic growth, an aging population, a real estate crisis, high youth unemployment — combined with unprecedented tension in trade relations with the United States, the European Union, and other countries, as well as its coercive policies toward countries of the Global South, have severely damaged the CCP's global influence. The report states that a sudden collapse of the CCP regime is not impossible, and preparations should be made for it. It therefore recommends that stabilizing a "post-CCP" China will require international cooperation, with the United States, as the global leader, ensuring stability in China and promoting its peaceful transition to a democratic system — otherwise, global order itself could be affected. The timing of this report's release, coinciding with a mysterious and unsettled atmosphere in Beijing, like a fog-shrouded city full of riddles, makes it all the more noteworthy.

It is worth recalling that during Trump's first term, his national security team likewise argued that the CCP regime needed to change. Then-Vice President Pence criticized: the United States had once hoped that economic liberalization would allow China to build a better partnership with us and with the world, but instead, China chose economic aggression, emboldening its increasingly powerful military; nor did Beijing, as we had hoped, lead its own people toward greater freedom — instead, China has built a surveillance state without precedent. Then-Secretary of State Pompeo warned: the engagement strategy we have long pursued did not, as President Nixon had hoped, produce internal change in China; in fact, our policies and those of other free nations rescued China's failing economy, only to see Beijing repay the countries that extended a helping hand with betrayal; we must find more creative and forceful ways to compel the CCP to change, because Beijing's conduct threatens our people and our prosperity; if the free world does not change communist China, communist China will surely change us. However, the subsequent Biden administration declared it "does not seek to change China's system." Yet before long, Trump's second term arrived.

Not long ago, a former US ambassador and a former national security adviser boldly claimed in a public post that Xi Jinping had already lost power. Whether this prediction proves reliable will only be confirmed in time. Still, it can serve as one indicator of whether the once all-powerful Xi Jinping might be beginning to fall from his peak, and whether Washington's political circles are starting to take this possibility seriously. On the other hand, Trump, known for speaking bluntly, has revealed nothing on this front. His administration still treats Xi Jinping as its counterpart; the prospect of a Trump-Xi summit has not disappeared, and negotiations over reciprocal US-China tariffs remain open. There are even reports that China hawks within the Trump administration have recently seen their influence curbed, with easing tensions with China, pressuring Putin, a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire, and an Israel-Hamas ceasefire becoming current priorities. Earlier, there were rumors that Trump might be invited to join commemorations on September 3 marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan, but Trump said: "I am not seeking a meeting with Xi Jinping, unless he personally invites me to China." Could Trump be the one to solve the mystery of Beijing's politics? Should something change in China, what Trump might do in response is a matter of great curiosity.

For some time now, claims that Xi Jinping's singular grip on power is faltering have been met with both belief and skepticism. Sifting through various rumors, they generally point to loss of power, a division of authority, or health issues. Yet, judging by what has actually happened — for instance, the fact that PLA generals personally promoted by Xi Jinping have fallen one after another in quick succession — health alone cannot fully explain it. Logically speaking, if this were simply a matter of Xi's personal physical condition, the transfer of power should flow toward the leadership team Xi himself built. The fall of senior PLA officials, coming like shooting stars, suggests another explanation: that it is not Xi himself acting, but rival factions "purging those close to the ruler." The power struggle within the CCP's top leadership remains a black box that outsiders cannot see into clearly. What can be observed is this: at the end of 2022, Hu Jintao was "escorted out" of the CCP's 20th Party Congress. Exactly one year later, Li Keqiang "suddenly died of a heart attack." And more recently, at several important events, Xi Jinping has failed to appear, or his aura has noticeably dimmed.

Beyond the many speculations, there are also rumors of a certain arrangement: that even those opposed to the CCP's degeneration into a one-man Xi regime remain committed to "maintaining stability," to avoid chaos and disorder erupting across the country, which could trigger a cascade of complications endangering the CCP regime itself. One piece of corroborating evidence: the CCP's overall campaign against Taiwan has continued full steam ahead, unaffected by rumors of a power struggle at the top. In other words, whether Xi Jinping remains firmly in place, with the CCP regime's dominion intact, or whether power slips into the hands of a rival faction, the CCP as a whole will likely remain in charge either way. This suspense drama, for now, leaves no room for imagining a "democratic China," nor does it allow room for pro-democracy activists or outside forces to intervene. Objectively, this is the harsh reality: any call for democracy is swiftly suppressed by the CCP's stability-maintenance apparatus, and no stabilizing force capable of replacing the CCP is yet visible. It seems that "promoting China's peaceful transition to a democratic system" still awaits the right conditions to take shape. Of course, the efforts of those who hope for this matter greatly as well. If the West does not, as it did during the Cold War, cultivate ideas and organizations the way it did in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Poland, it is hard to predict where a "post-CCP" China might head.

Politics is the art of the possible, and so is international politics. One day, perhaps unexpectedly, China could be transformed by causes no one anticipated — just as the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 saw a single spark rapidly spread into a prairie fire, suddenly toppling one-party rule like a collapsing edifice. Should a "democratic China" emerge at that point, it would certainly be a good thing. But it is also possible that, following the CCP regime's collapse, China could move in an even more totalitarian direction. Honestly speaking, it is hard to say whether these different possibilities represent more opportunity or more challenge for the world.