Under the watchful eyes of the world, Xi Jinping's government has once again revealed the short-sightedness and eagerness for quick results behind its economic policy — treating the symptoms while leaving the disease untouched. On September 24, three of the CCP's top financial and economic ministries jointly rolled out a so-called "flood of liquidity," attempting to rescue a Chinese economy on the verge of collapse through a package of measures including interest-rate cuts and reduced bank reserve requirements. Within days, stock markets rebounded, with the Shanghai Composite and the Hang Seng Index surging, seemingly showing that these policies were working. Yet a short-term rally in the stock market can in no way mask the deep-seated crisis in China's economy, still less paper over the fundamental failure of Xi Jinping's government to address structural problems through temporary expedients. Superficial Prosperity Cannot Hide the Truth of Collapsing Consumption The fundamental problem facing China's economy today is weak consumption and sluggish domestic demand. The flood-of-liquidity policy aims to stimulate consumption by releasing more liquidity into the system, but this strategy is bound to fail. China's middle class is under multiple pressures — unemployment, stagnant wage growth, continually falling home prices — that have severely eroded its spending power. Even if more money is injected into the market, public confidence and real purchasing power will not recover as a result. The contraction in consumer demand is a structural problem; short-term monetary policy can only boost confidence on the surface, without actually improving the underlying economic environment. Beijing's stimulus measures cannot solve these problems, because they fail to address the core factors behind weak consumption — unfair income distribution, a rigid economic model, and worsening social inequality. The public's spending power cannot be restored through short-term stimulus; what is needed is systemic reform, including a stronger social safety net, better protection of labor rights, and fairer distribution — not further inflation of financial-market bubbles and the continued expansion of crony capital. The Collapse of the Real-Estate Bubble Has Only Just Begun China's real-estate market has been the main engine of economic growth since the 2000s, but now this enormous bubble is bursting. Although the government has tried to stimulate homebuying demand and curb the decline in prices through interest-rate and reserve-requirement cuts, the core problems in the property market remain unresolved. Developers are saddled with heavy debt, homebuyers have lost all confidence, and the property-speculation "feast" is over. Beijing's so-called "market rescue" measures do nothing to halt the continued downturn in real estate — if anything, they intensify the systemic risk in this sector. Even though the CCP's top leadership is unwilling to face this problem squarely, the prolonged slump in real estate is destined to become a mortal wound for China's economy. This means not only that millions of homebuyers will see their wealth shrink, but that the huge tax revenues and loan interest that local governments and financial institutions depend on from real estate will vanish, triggering a chain reaction of further economic problems. If Xi Jinping's government continues to rely on real estate to drive economic growth, it is no different from quenching thirst with poison. A Deteriorating Global Economic Environment Leaves China Isolated and Friendless China's foreign trade was once a major driver of economic growth, but the current global landscape is clearly unfavorable to China's export-oriented economy. As more countries push back against Chinese dumping and pursue diversified supply chains, Chinese manufacturing faces severe international competitive pressure. Yet Xi Jinping's government continues to wishfully assume that short-term stimulus alone can sustain export prosperity — a view plainly out of touch with reality. Against a backdrop of falling global demand for Chinese goods, supply-chain restructuring, and strained international economic cooperation, China's economy can no longer recover through its old growth model. Beijing's decision-makers have failed to recognize this, and instead continue to rely on the old approach of trade- and investment-driven growth, trying to use financial policy to stimulate domestic consumption and investment as a substitute for lost external demand. But with internal and external contradictions intertwined — falling foreign demand for Chinese goods on one side, weak domestic consumption on the other — the only outcome can be economic stagnation, or even collapse. Conclusion: Short-Sighted Policies Will Trigger an Even Greater Economic Disaster The policies currently being pursued by Xi Jinping's government may appear effective on the surface, but they amount to nothing more than treating the head when the head aches and the foot when the foot hurts. The real trouble with China's economy lies in systemic, institutional problems — not insufficient liquidity or a temporary lack of demand. The government's policymaking lacks any long-term vision; relying solely on a monetary policy of flooding the market with cash will not only fail to ease the current economic distress, it will intensify systemic risk. China's economy now stands at a historic crossroads. Short-sighted policies of flooding the market with liquidity and cash handouts will only sustain a superficial prosperity for a while, before leading to a far deeper economic collapse. Unless Xi Jinping thoroughly rethinks his current policies and changes the direction of governance, China's economy will plunge into an abyss — and could even trigger domestic and international turmoil more severe than the 2008 global financial crisis. The short-term boom will end; long-term decline has already become inevitable.